Pierre Bourdieu by Robbins, D. & Robbins, D.




The very last sentence of the ‘auto-analysis’ which Bourdieu wrote during the last six months 
of his life, between the autumn of 2001 and the spring of 2002, reads: 
“Nothing would make me more happy than to have succeeded in enabling some of my 
readers, male or female, to recognize their own experiences, difficulties, questions, 
sorrows, etc., in mine so that they can derive from this realist identification, which is 
completely opposed to an exalted perspective, some means to act and live a little 
better in how they live and behave.”1 
The passage contains some key indicators of the impulses which governed Bourdieu’s work 
throughout his career.  His motivation was primarily moral, but this was a motivation which 
he regarded as a process of sharing rather than imposition.  He knew that he derived his moral 
imperative from the social conditions of his formation and he believed that his moral 
intention should be prosecuted by offering his own attempts to reconcile his emotional and 
intellectual drives as models to be adopted and adapted by other people in relation to the 
different conditions of their formation.  His sociological work was not undertaken to disclose 
objective ‘truths’ about universal social behaviour or even about the society within which he 
lived.  His sociological enquiries were always rooted, methodologically and 
epistemologically, in his own lived experience and he was always systematically conscious of 
the extent to which his ‘findings’ reflected his personal perspective. Accordingly, he offered 
these findings provisionally in the expectation that they would elicit a ‘socio-analytic 
encounter’ between the observer and the observed which, in turn, would facilitate a 
‘recognition’ of their situations in the readers of the published observations.  The passage 
spells out both that he was sceptical about the intrinsic value of ‘exalted perspectives’ or 
objective analyses, and also that he was aware of the difficulties involved in offering realist 
moral prescriptions across cultures (in this case, in particular, across gender).  He always 
believed that his ‘work’ was the product of three dimensions - the social conditions of 
generation of his research enquiries and procedures (the socio-logic of his discovery); the 
process of ‘writing-up’ ‘findings’ (the rhetoric of textual communication within a ‘field’ of 
discourse); and the social conditions of reception, whether by those whose experiences were 
in affinity with the objects of the research or by those who extrapolated them to contexts of 
intellectual exchange. 
 
Bourdieu’s work reflects a fundamental tension or dissociation between affectivity and 
intellectuality which he attributed to his upbringing.  We can say that his career and life 
represented an attempt to cultivate both aspects of his personality and to engineer a 
conjunction between the two which did not allow either to be submerged within the other.  
He was brought up in a rural community in provincial France – in Béarn in Gascony in 
South-West France near to the Pyrenees and the border with Spain.  After his primary 
education in his local village, Bourdieu received his secondary education as a boarder in the 
lycée in Pau, the main town of the region.  He experienced a disjunction between the 
Béarnais dialect used in his home community and the French which was the language of 
scholastic instruction.  He excelled as a student but he always considered this to be 
‘excellence’ achieved within an artificial language game.  His scholastic achievements 
propelled him to Paris and he entered the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in 1950.  This 
was an ‘élite’ institution which admitted the ‘best’ students from lycées throughout France.  
Admission institutionalised the ‘distinction’ from other students which Bourdieu experienced 
with unease. 
 
At the ENS, Bourdieu’s training was in philosophy.  There were two main influences.  He 
was interested in the history and philosophy of science.  This led him to submit a thesis for a 
higher education diploma on Leibniz’s critique of Descartes’s philosophy of science.  He was 
also influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, which led him to propose a doctoral thesis on 
‘the temporal structures of affective life’.  His initiation into philosophical thinking provided 
him with a legitimate intellectual discourse within which to consider his life experiences – 
that is to say that he was influenced by a philosophy which enabled him to articulate the 
differences which he experienced between affectivity and cognition.  Leibniz and Descartes 
provided alternative theories both of which suggested that empirical investigation is governed 
by prior, rational dispositions, while Husserl suggested that the crisis of European science 
was that it had lost contact with the affective origins of its rational conceptualisations. 
 
Bourdieu was not able to pursue his proposed doctoral research.  Instead, he was conscripted 
in 1956 to serve in the French army in Algeria. After military service, he was appointed a 
lecturer in the University of Algiers where he remained from 1958 to 1960.  During these 
years he began what he was to call ‘fieldwork in philosophy’.  He carried out research on the 
implications for individuals of the process of transition from traditional to modern social 
organization.  This was a process of affective adaptation or acculturation imposed by French 
colonial intervention.  Bourdieu was interested in the process itself and, even more, in 
seeking to come to terms with the fact that his analyses were the products of observations 
made by the socio-politically dominant of the behaviour of the dominated.  His Algerian 
research was the foundation of all his subsequent work, especially in as much as the 
experience confirmed for him that researchers are immanently present within the phenomena 
which they study (following Leibniz) and should not cultivate a detached objectivity (as 
would be the logic of the mind/body dualism of Descartes). 
 
On returning to mainland France in 1960, Bourdieu became secretary to a new research group 
which had just been established by Raymond Aron.  During the 1960s, he carried out 
sociological research on education and culture within which he developed many of the 
concepts which have been used by subsequent researchers – ‘habitus’, ‘field’, ‘cultural 
capital’.  He remained concerned about the power relationship between researchers and 
researched and, in 1968, he co-edited Le métier de sociologue [the craft of sociology] which 
attempted to offer a manual of methodology for students.  The title indicated that the activity 
of the sociologist should be regarded as a form of labour in society rather than as an 
opportunity to observe society in detachment.  Influenced by Bachelard’s historical 
epistemology, Bourdieu and his co-editors argued that to practise their craft sociologists must 
‘win’ social facts against commonsense social knowledge; must ‘construct’ a discourse for 
communication; and must ‘confirm’ their findings in discussion with others in an epistemic 
community of like-minded intellectuals.  However, after witnessing the unsuccessful  
‘student revolt’ of May, 1968, Bourdieu became more inclined to regard institutionalised 
sociological practice as one of the factors sustaining social inequalities.  He took control of 
Aron’s research group and began to articulate a ‘post-structuralist’ philosophy of social 
science.  The ‘epistemological breaks’ recommended by Bachelard had been used in Le 
métier de sociologue as a way of legitimising sociological distinction.  Following Husserl 
more than Bachelard, Bourdieu transformed the notion of ‘breaks’ to suggest that rigorous 
scrutiny of the language of science might be the means to understanding the primary 
experience which underlies scientific objectification.  Bourdieu proposed that there are ‘three 
modes of theoretical knowledge’.  In respect of social science, there is, firstly, the 
unreflecting experience of our social worlds which we all have, and then, secondly, there is 
the objective knowledge of that world which professional sociologists develop.  Bourdieu 
was not content to accept this division.  He emphasized a third ‘break’.  He came to insist that 
all sociological practice should be ‘reflexive’, by which he meant that it should be an intrinsic 
element in the work of sociologists to subject to sociological scrutiny the origins and 
development of the conceptual language they use to attempt to interpret social behaviour.  By 
this means, Bourdieu contended, the tendency of sociology to sustain the social domination 
of sociologists would be diminished. 
 
The corollary of Bourdieu’s ‘reflexivity’, therefore, was that sociological discourse has to be 
recognized as being a language game which constructs social meanings in accordance with 
the predispositions of a group of social actors whose interpretations are conditioned by their 
social positions which must themselves be analysed sociologically.  By developing and 
seeking to deploy this philosophy of social science, Bourdieu tried to reconcile his orientation 
to understand phenomena sociologically with his principled commitment to egalitarianism.  
In his later work, such as the project he directed leading to the publication of La misère du 
monde [the Weight of the World] (1993), Bourdieu tried to practise what he preached.  He 
contended that sociologists are particular kinds of participants in general ‘socio-analytic 
encounter’ and that the function of social research is to be ‘maieutic’, to be midwife to the 
voice of citizens.  Bourdieu’s orientation was not at all to denigrate sociological research but, 
rather, to insist on the benefits which would follow if mass democratic society were to 
become sociologically self-aware. 
 
 
Section 2.   
 
‘Habitus’. 
Bourdieu used a word borrowed from scholastic philosophy to indicate an aspect of human 
behaviour in society which is not adequately conveyed by the word ‘habit’.  Bourdieu 
suggested that our dispositions to act in society are circumscribed by the attitudes and 
characteristics which we inherit.  They are circumscribed, but he developed the concept of 
‘habitus’ to suggest that our dispositions are not conditioned.  He insisted that the ways in 
which people behave are distinguished by their positions on a continuum which means that, 
at one extreme, people are closely conditioned by their class and family backgrounds while, 
at the other extreme, they shape their own futures in relative freedom, guided by personal 
aspirations.  Bourdieu called the first extreme that which led to ‘mechanistic’ explanatory 
theories, and the second extreme that which led to ‘finalist’ theories.  Bourdieu resisted 
theorising which supposed that there might be an absolute and static correlation between 
individuals and society.  Bourdieu’s scepticism about ‘mechanism’ caused him to resist 
forms of crude Marxism but he also opposed the legacy of Sartre’s existentialism which 
pre-supposed absolute freedom.  The fact that he thought that French existentialist thinking 
was an expression of the social conditions of resistance to Nazi occupation is an example of 
the way in which he always argued that conceptual formulae have to be understood in 
relation to the social conditions of their production.  The ‘habitus’ of every individual is 
different.  It is not a ‘thing’ but, rather, it is an attempt to register the components of 
characteristics which are unique for every individual.  Neither does it represent exclusively 
‘rational’ dispositions.  It is closely related to the concept of ‘hexis’ by which Bourdieu 




Bourdieu developed the idea of ‘cultural capital’ in the research which he carried out in the 
early 1960s on the performance of socially disadvantaged students in French universities.  
In part he did this in opposition to the idea of ‘human capital’ outlined in the United States 
by Gary Becker at the time.  Bourdieu thought that Becker was treating individual 
capacities as absolutes and as measurable assets.  Bourdieu sought to oppose an 
economistic approach to the securing of life chances.  He tried to appropriate the language 
of economics to suggest that the exchange of capital assets is relative to the social 
estimation of value and the social construction of hierarchies of culture.  For Bourdieu, 
there is no gold standard of cultural value.  He accepted the view that the French higher 
education system excluded many students at the point of admission, but he went further to 
demonstrate that the curriculum discriminated against the minority of working-class or 
provincial students who did gain admission.  Structural discrimination was intrinsic to the 
system since educational success was secured by assessment in terms of cultural knowledge 
which was already familiar to middle class students prior to entry rather than in terms of the 
degree of knowledge acquired by those who had no such privilege.  He maintained, 
therefore, that the education system consolidated existing class distinctions in society 
through the arbitrary imposition of arbitrary power.  Disadvantaged students failed in this 
system because their lack of ‘cultural capital’ on entry was deliberately misrecognized as 
their individual intellectual deficiency rather than as the consequence of a conspiracy 
enabling the socially dominant to continue to exclude the socially dominated.  This 
misrecognition preserved the social status quo, and, for Bourdieu, this confirmed that an 
educational system which he supposed had been devised to maximise the learning 
opportunities for all was no longer fit for this egalitarian purpose.  If the education system 
could not be reformed, the quest for social equality would have to turn to other, new 
cultural forms which might achieve a more equitable transmission and distribution of 
cultural values.  Bourdieu hoped that photographic practice might democratize art, but he 
was depressed to find that it quickly absorbed aesthetic assumptions.  For Bourdieu, 
photography was a new cultural technology.  His hopes, and his despondency, might be 
mirrored today in relation to the ambivalent value of social media.  
Bourdieu also developed the idea of ‘social capital’ by analogy, but this was in order to 
analyse the ways in which people use relations with others to establish and strengthen their 
social positions.  Bourdieu did not see it as a thing which can be quantified and mobilised 
in the way in which the term has been used since by Coleman and Putnam. 
At the time of writing La Distinction (1979), Bourdieu refined his concept of ‘cultural 
capital’.  He wrote an article (‘Les trois états du capital culturel’) in which he distinguished 
between ‘incorporated’, ‘objectivated’ and ‘instituted’ cultural capitals.  The first made 
cultural capital very like the ‘habitus’.  The second and third were recognitions that 
individual cultural dispositions become objectified in markets of symbols and institutions 
which then become as potent influences over individual choices as background family or 
class interests.  Historically, this represented Bourdieu’s recognition that traditional and 
modern assumptions about the nature of the inter-generational transmission of values were 




Bourdieu developed ‘field’ theory to enable him to analyse the ways in which knowledge is 
produced and consolidated – in discourses and in institutions.  Bourdieu worked with 
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms which had been an attempt to elaborate on Kant’s 
understanding that there are a priori categories of knowledge which shape our perceptions 
of the world.  Bourdieu transformed Cassirer’s thinking by arguing that the varieties of 
‘forms’ of apprehension are socially constructed.  What we regard as ‘disciplines’ or forms 
of knowledge originate in particular socio-historical conditions but they also acquire a life 
of their own which is then inter-generationally transmitted. 
 
Bourdieu derived ‘field’ terminology from the theory of electromagnetic fields of James 
Clerk Maxwell in the 19th century and, more proximately, from its use in the 20th Century 
in psychology and phenomenology by Kurt Lewin and Aron Gurwitsch.  In the 1960s, 
Bourdieu used it as a way of counteracting the hermeneutic and subjectivist orientation in 
social science so as to undertake analyses which showed that individuals constitute 
themselves within social networks rather than ego-centrically.  Increasingly, however, 
subjectivism crept back in as much as Bourdieu presented his objectivist science as the 
product of his particular individual trajectory.  His posthumously published Esquisse pour 
une auto-analyse was an attempt to analyse his own formation in terms of the fields within 




The three ‘key’ concepts described above were deliberately deployed as concepts, that is to 
say as devices to grasp the meaning of phenomena with language (con [with]-cipere 
[grasp]).  Bourdieu was influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception 
and was, therefore, well aware of the necessary distinction between perception and 
conception.  Concepts do not refer to antecedent realities.  They deploy words tangentially 
as instruments which enable new ways of perception. 
The development of the concept of ‘reproduction’ has been one in which, most acutely, 
there has been tension in understanding whether Bourdieu was offering it as a 
representation of general reality or as a word which functioned pragmatically at the time to 
explain what was happening in French higher education.  The culmination of the 
educational research which Bourdieu undertook in the 1960s was the publication, with 
Jean-Claude Passeron, of La reproduction [Reproduction] in 1970.  The sub-title of the 
French text was: ‘Éléments pour une théorie du système d’enseignement’ [elements for a 
theory of the educational system].  It was in this book that they argued that the educational 
system was a mechanism whereby those with ‘arbitrary’ power transmitted ‘arbitrary’ 
culture as if it possessed absolute value.  The concept of ‘cultural capital’ was a device to 
understand the possession or dispossession of the culture necessary to be deemed 
educationally successful. 
Very soon after the publication of the book, Bourdieu gave a paper which was published in 
1973 as ‘Reproduction culturelle et reproduction sociale’ [cultural reproduction and social 
reproduction].  Bourdieu articulated the view that ‘cultures’ are reflections of social 
position and that hierarchies of taste perpetuate social hierarchies.  This refusal to accept 
the autonomy of cultures was developed analytically in La distinction. Passeron disowned 
this representation of their jointly authored book.  He suspected that Bourdieu was 
introducing an universally valid relationship between culture and society, whereas the 
intention of the book was that it should generate concepts which provisionally explained 
relations which would always be in transition.  The concept of ‘reproduction’ is an 
important test-case in terms of whether it is a generalisable account of actuality or a 




Luigi Pirandello’s Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore [Six Characters in Search of an Author] 
was first performed in May, 1921, in the Teatro Valle, Rome.  Pirandello was born in Sicily 
in 1867 and died in Rome in 1936.  There is little overlap in the lifetimes of Pirandello and 
Bourdieu, but there is some affinity between the two men in that they both felt that they 
were brought up at the margins of their nation-states and both felt that early circumstances 
(the prosperity of Pirandello’s father and Bourdieu’s elitist education) had separated them 
from the disadvantages experienced by their contemporaries in their childhood.  Perhaps 
this explains why Pirandello’s ‘absurd’ drama about identity provides a perspective on 
Bourdieu’s ‘world-view’. 
 
As the opening stage instruction puts it:  “The audience enters the theatre to find the curtain 
already raised, and the stage looking as it does during the day, with no wings or scenery, 
almost completely dark and empty, ...”.  A Technician appears and makes some repairs.  
The Stage Manager comes on and urges the Technician to finish his job at the end of the 
rehearsal.  The company is about to work on Act Two of Rules of the Game (an earlier 
Pirandello play which had been first performed in 1918).  Nine or ten actors drift in 
casually.  These include ‘the Leading Lady’ and ‘the Leading Man’.  They are followed by 
the Director and the Prompter.  At the Director’s request, the Prompter begins to read the 
stage directions for the scene.  When the prompter reads that the scene is set in ‘an unusual 
room, serving as both dining-room and study’, the Director intervenes to instruct the Stage 
Manager that the company will be using ‘the red room set’.  When the Prompter reads that 
the main male character is ‘wearing a chef’s hat and apron’ when the curtain rises and is 
busy ‘beating an egg in a bowl’, the Leading Man asks whether he has to wear a chef’s hat 
because, surely, ‘it’s a bit silly’.  The Director insists that he must because ‘it is in the 
script’ and then he proceeds to try to explain the meaning of the egg-shells to the Leading 
Man, concluding with the comment that ‘you’re involved in a game, playing a part you’ve 
been assigned, and you consciously become your own puppet’.  Almost immediately after 
the director offers this interpretation of Rules of the Game, a doorman interrupts the 
Director to announce the arrival of ‘six Characters’.  The stage instruction emphasizes that 
‘every effort should be made not to confuse’ these six Characters with the Actors.  
Pirandello goes so far as to suggest that one way to ensure this differentiation would be if 
the six Characters were to wear masks representing their ‘fundamental emotion’ – 
‘remorse’, ‘revenge’, ‘contempt’ and ‘sorrow’ in four cases.  It is important, Pirandello 
adds, that the characters ‘should not appear as unreal beings, but rather as created reality, 
immutable constructs of the imagination’ and ‘the masks will help to give the impression of 
figures created by art, ...’. 
The Characters explain to the Director that they have a story to tell but are in search of an 
author. When the director retorts that ‘there’s no author here – it’s not a new play we’re 
doing’, one of the characters excitedly remarks: ‘That’s all the better – that’s so much 
better, sir!  We can be your new play!’.  The Director gradually gets drawn into allowing 
the narrative offered by the Characters to become the play to be performed by his company.  
The Prompter becomes the mediator, transcribing the narrative of the Characters to become 
the script for the Actors.  There are tensions as the narrative is translated into the script of a 
drama, but, in spite of the fact that the Characters sometimes feel that their narrative is 
misrepresented in the language of the play, they are satisfied because the process 
transforms their everyday experience into an aesthetic product which transcends the 
contingency of their situations. 
 
My suggestion is that Pirandello’s play gives a perspective on Bourdieu’s intellectual work.  
Durkheim had distinguished between the social organisations of traditional and modern 
societies by arguing that the former exhibited ‘mechanical’ and the latter ‘organic’ 
solidarity.  In traditional societies, Durkheim claimed, people behaved mechanically in 
accordance with prescribed roles, whereas the characteristic of modern society is that 
people have become individuated and are able to participate in determining how their 
societies should be organized.  Bourdieu sought to maximise self-determination for all 
social actors.  He would have been sympathetic to Sartre’s account, in Being and 
Nothingness, of the ‘bad faith’ of the waiter in failing to exercise his freedom to disown his 
prescribed professional role.  Unlike Sartre, however, Bourdieu argued that we exercise 
freedom within inherited constraints (the ‘habitus’) rather than absolutely.  Pirandello’s 
Director at first insists that his Actors must adhere precisely to the prescribed script of the 
play which they are rehearsing (even though that play itself is about the attempt of 
characters to define their own identities within the rules of the game).  Six Characters arrive 
who want the Director to represent their everyday experience as a play to be performed still 
by Actors.  For Pirandello, perhaps, drama offers the characters the opportunity for their 
experiences to be transformed, securing transcendental immortality for the disadvantaged 
through the mediation of art.  The Characters acquiesce in this process of transformation 
even though they find that it distorts their own sense of the meaning of their experiences.  
By contrast, Bourdieu did not accept that artistic forms possess any intrinsic capacity to 
provide transcendence.  Bourdieu would have recognized that we have hitherto, for over 
one hundred years in Western Europe, accepted the representation of social reality provided 
by social scientists (Actors).  By training, he operated as an Actor but, during his career, he 
saw his task as being one which would break down the distinction between Actors and 
Characters.  Following Goffman, Bourdieu would have been prepared to see social life as 





Bourdieu’s work was little known in the English-speaking world until the mid-1980s when 
Polity Press, Cambridge began to publish it in translation such that, by the time of his death 
in 2002, most of his many major texts had become available in English.  Polity Press 
sustains Bourdieu’s global influence still with the publication of some of Bourdieu’s 
previously untranslated early work in Algeria and, now, through the publication of the 
editions currently under preparation in France of the courses of lectures which Bourdieu 
gave from 1981 at the Collège de France, Paris.  During his lifetime, his work was also 
translated extensively into many other languages and the study of the pattern of translations 
is revealing about cross-cultural transmission between ‘fields’ of production and reception.  
Precisely because Bourdieu attempted to offer his methodology as a model to be adapted 
pragmatically, his influence has not been prescriptive. He wanted to offer his science for 
the benefit of social movements, both in France and internationally. Based on lectures 
which he gave in Tokyo, his Practical Reason discusses the international transferability of 
his concepts, and a book such as Lardinois & Thapan: Reading Pierre Bourdieu in a Dual 
Context (2006) pursues the same question in respect of Franco-Indian conceptual transfer. 
Bourdieu’s work has been so influential because it is in accord with what appears to be a 
global trend towards mass democratic participation.  Because his thinking emerged out of 
his observations of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and of tensions between traditionalism, 
modernity and postmodernity, it has consistently spoken to the situations of peoples at 
different points on a supposed scale of ‘progress’. 
Trained as a philosopher, Bourdieu achieved his academic status and authority at a time 
when ‘sociology’ was becoming professionalised as a discipline in France.  His research 
was always ‘fieldwork in philosophy’.  Le métier de sociologue was an attempt to safeguard 
philosophical sociology from the ostentatiously a-philosophical incursions of American 
neo-positivist sociology.  The text which he co-edited with James Coleman (Social Theory 
for a Changing Society, 1989) exposed the nature of this methodological and ideological 
conflict.  Consideration of the work of Luc Boltanski enables us to reflect on the 
consequences of the professionalization of social science.  Boltanski trained as a sociologist 
and then became a follower of Bourdieu until about 1980.  Still sympathetic towards his 
‘patron’, Boltanski nevertheless was critical of what he thought to be the philosophical 
errors of the 1968 generation, including Bourdieu, in Boltanski & Chiapello:  The New 
Spirit of Capitalism (2007).  Michèle Lamont’s work follows on from that of Bourdieu in a 
critical fashion.  Her Money, Morals, Manners, 1992, corresponds with Bourdieu’s 
Distinction, while her How Professors Think:  Inside the Curious World of Academic 
Judgment, 2009, corresponds with Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus. 
Recent work in the UK which has built on Bourdieu’s Distinction to carry out an analysis 
of contemporary British culture (in Bennett, Savage, Warde, et al., Culture, Class, 
Distinction, 2009) is questioning Bourdieu’s reluctance to allow aesthetic practice to 






Recommended works by Bourdieu (in chronological order of their first French publication): 
 a. 
“Champ intellectuel et projet créateur”, Les temps modernes, 246, 1966, 865-906, 
translated as « Intellectual field and creative project » in M.F.D. Young, ed., 1971, 
Knowledge and Control.  New Directions for the Sociology of Education, London, 
Collier-Macmillan, 1971, 161-88. 
This article first appeared in a number of Sartre’s journal devoted to the ‘Problems of 
structuralism’.  Bourdieu introduced the concept of ‘field’ to explain the structures of 
relations between artists and their publics, but, importantly, he was already suggesting that 
these structures are internalised by artists as intrinsic components of the creative process and, 
further, that there is a need to be clear about the differences between immanent processes in 
history and our present impositions of meaning.  What he said here about art also applied to 
knowledge production in general. 
 b. 
 Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
This is regarded as the translation of Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de trois 
études d’ethnologie kabyle, Droz, Geneva, 1972, but Bourdieu took the opportunity provided 
by the English translation to reorganise his text.  In the French text Bourdieu re-published 
three of his early ‘structuralist’ articles on Algeria and then criticised their methodology 
whereas in the English text he advanced a positive theory which can be called post-
structuralist.  In the English-speaking world this has been regarded as a contribution to 
anthropological theory, but it is a crucial text for understanding a key moment in the 
development of Bourdieu’s thinking generally. 
 c. 
“Sur le pouvoir symbolique”, Annales, 3, May-June, 1977, 405-11.  Translated as 
« On symbolic Power » in J. Thompson, ed., Language & Symbolic Power, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, 163-70. 
This was originally given as a paper at Harvard University in 1973 and so belongs to the 
period in which Bourdieu was consolidating the development of his post-structuralist 
thinking.  Bourdieu situates his thinking in relation to Panofsky (a pupil of Cassirer) and 
others, and articulates a distinction between two kinds of structure.  Analysis of ‘structuring 
structures’  involves consideration of the social conditions of construction of the ‘structured 
structures’ which operate according to the rules of ‘fields’ or, as Bourdieu puts it, which 
operate tautologically. 
 d. 
Distinction.  A social critique of the judgement of taste, London & New York, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. 
This is the English translation of La distinction, Paris, Minuit, 1979.  The French sub-title is:  
Critique sociale du jugement [a social critique of judgment] which makes it clear that the 
book is Bourdieu’s sociological response to the aesthetic philosophy contained in Kant’s third 
Critique (of Judgment).  Bourdieu analyses a variety of cultural tastes, including food, sport, 
and fashion as well as ‘art’ in terms of people’s strategies of position-taking designed to 
secure social distinction for themselves.  Many followers of Bourdieu defected because they 
thought that his book denigrated working-class culture, but it is actually a subtle and complex 
recognition of relativities of judgement. 
  
Recommended secondary texts. 
 e. 
 Richard Jenkins:  Pierre Bourdieu, London & New York, 1992. 
This was one of the earliest attempts to understand the totality of Bourdieu’s work (up to the 
date of publication).  Jenkins’s introduction is deficient in thinking that much of Bourdieu’s 
Algerian work ‘is not particularly germane’ to its discussion.  He was also amongst those 
who disliked Distinction, but his general view is that Bourdieu is ‘good to think with’ even if 
you don’t accept his findings.  This raises the wider question of the status of all canonical 
texts for present sociological enquiry. 
 f. 
 Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, & Moishe Postone, eds.,  Bourdieu:  Critical 
Perspectives, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993. 
 This collection of essays grew out of Bourdieu’s connections with the Centre for 
Psychosocial Studies in Chicago from 1983 onwards and emanated in particular from a 
conference  held in the United States in 1989.  Most of the contributors were American and 
the book is indicative of elements in the field of American reception of Bourdieu at the time.  
I specifically recommend Rogers Brubaker’s “Social Theory as Habitus” which was an early 
recognition of the status of social theory in Bourdieu’s thinking – as correlative to his social 
trajectory rather than autonomous.  Bourdieu’s concluding remarks in response to the 
collection:  “For a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works” deserves attention in 
that he announces the way in which he thinks his texts should be read. 
 g. 
Michael Grenfell, ed, Pierre Bourdieu. Key Concepts, Durham, Acumen. [1st edition, 
2008; 2nd edition, 2012]. 
This collection is recommended because Grenfell adheres to the spirit of Bourdieu’s work in 
editing a volume which is designed to be of practical use and to encourage reflexivity in 
practitioners.  It contains chapters in Parts entitled ‘biography, theory and practice’,  ‘field 
theory – beyond subjectivity and objectivity’, ‘field mechanisms’, ‘field conditions’, and 
‘applications’. 
 h. 
 Simon Susen & Bryan S. Turner, eds., The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu.  Critical 
Essays, London, Anthem Press, 2011.  
This collection assembles 15 contributions from, mainly, European scholars.  The editors’ 
introduction is particularly stimulating because it situates Bourdieu’s work in the socio-
political context of post World War II Europe and in the context of different European 
intellectual traditions.  The collection is recommended precisely because it is not partisanly 
‘Bourdieusian’.  Susen’s doctoral research was supervised in part by Luc Boltanski, and he 
has also published a book on ‘the foundations of the social’ in which he explores the relations 





1   Bourdieu, P., 2004, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, Paris, Raisons d’Agir, 142.   
